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   Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? 
Evidence from a social experiment  
by 
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Abstract 
During the last decade several empirical studies have stressed the importance of norms 
and social interactions for explaining sickness absence behavior. In this context public 
discussions about the intentions of the insurance, and of the rights and duties of the 
receivers, may be important for reducing the sickness absence. In this paper we study 
whether information meetings about the Swedish sickness insurance affect the length of 
sickness absence spells. The study is based on experimental data on individuals with 
weak labor market attachments. The displacement of when the call to the meeting was 
sent out was randomized. Comparing the survival functions of those called immediately 
with those whose calls were delayed (by about 30 days) makes it possible to study 
whether the length of sickness absence is affected by receiving the call earlier. The 
result suggests that the length is reduced by, on average, 20 percent. In the long term 
(12 months later) there is no effect of the information meeting. This suggests that 
attendance to the information meeting does not change individuals’ long-term behavior. 
 
Keywords: monitoring, moral hazard, public social insurance, survival analysis, 
instrumental variables  
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2  IFAU – Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings?  1 Introduction 
The high and volatile work absence due to sickness observed in several countries during 
the last decades has spurred researchers to discuss the importance of norms and social 
interactions in this context (Lindbeck and Persson, 2010; Lindbeck and Nyberg, 2006; 
Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, 2003; Ichino and Maggi, 2000). Several studies have 
shown that norms are an important determinant for explaining the variation in sickness 
absence across regions in Sweden (Försäkringskassan, 2006; Lindbeck, Palme and 
Persson, 2004). In a study based on an extensive experiment undertaken in 1988, 
Hesselius, Johansson and Nilsson (2009) show evidence of social interactions in the 
workplace; how co-workers affect each other's effort as measured by work absence. 
Thus, one explanation for the increase of the sickness absence rate observed in Sweden 
between 1980 and 2000 could be a displacement of the norm for when it is appropriate 
to use sickness insurance. In this context public discussions about the intentions of the 
insurance, and of the rights and duties of the receivers, may be important for reducing 
sickness absence. 
This paper studies the effects of an information program run by the local social 
insurance office in Uppsala County. The objective of the program was to inform sick-
listed persons about the rights and duties associated with the sickness insurance. This 
was done by holding regular information meetings. The target group was everyone on 
the sick list in Uppsala County. The meetings were mandatory unless the participant 
was too sick to attend. Valid reasons for not attending were (of course) in-
hospitalization and acute illness. Since we only have data on individuals who lack a 
formal employer, this study focus on individuals with a weak labor market attachment.
2  
This program could potentially both have increased and decreased the use of sickness 
insurance. For example, receiving a call to a compulsory meeting could be perceived as 
increased monitoring and thereby reduce the use of sickness insurance. On the other 
hand, new information from the meeting could both increase and decrease the use of the 
                                                 
2 The local social insurance office in Uppsala (from which the data is collected) is divided into different divisions 
depending on the occupation of the insured people. Unfortunately, we only have data for this study from the division 
that handled people with a weak labor market attachment, i.e., unemployed or temporarily employed. 
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previous to the meeting.  
The main focus of this study is to estimate the combined effect of the meeting itself 
and of the call to the meeting on the duration in sickness absence. However, we will 
also use an instrumental variables estimator to estimate the effect of the meeting on 
sickness prevalence in the long term. The potential impact on the duration of the 
sickness can stem from a pre-treatment effect and/or from attending the meeting. We 
term the pre-treatment effect a “threat-effect”, since we believe that such an effect stems 
from perceived monitoring induced by the call.
3  
The analysis is based on a randomized displacement of when an individual received 
the call. The design is as follows. Case-workers contacted sick-listed individuals via 
letter to information meetings (IM) about once a month. When the case-worker had 
selected eligible individuals, half of them received a call as planned and the remainder 
of the individuals received the call on the next occasion, about one month later. This 
method enabled us to look into whether the group that received the call early (in their 
sickness-spell) left their sickness period faster than those who received the call later. 
An advantage of this experimental design is that the case-workers could continue to 
work as usual once the experiment was in place. This has two important implications. 
First, it was easy to perform the experiment.
4 Second, this design does not imply any 
substantial ethical considerations.
5 A further advantage of this experiment is that the 
sick-listed individuals have not been informed about the study, so there is no concern 
about potential Hawthorn effects, i.e. the participants will not change their behavior 
because they know that they are participating in an experiment. On the negative side, we 
can only identify a lower bound of the combined effect of receiving the call versus not 
receiving it.  
                                                 
3 This term is used in the context of tying benefit payments to labor market programs (Black et al., 2003; Geerdsen, 
2006). 
4 In social sciences, experimental studies are rare. One reason for this is that they are often associated with practical 
inconveniences and high organizational costs. With this design practically no extra costs were imposed on the case-
workers. 
5 Unequal treatment is an argument often used to prevent implementation of an experiment. With this design, also the 
control individuals may receive the treatment later. 
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percent by the information program. A low attendance at the meeting (30 percent) 
suggests that a significant part of the effect stems from the “threat”. However, we also 
find an effect of attending the meeting on sickness prevalence in an intermediate 
perspective (about 6 months after the call) but no long-term effects (about 12 months 
after the call).  
Our conclusion is that, at least for this population, it is possible to shorten the length 
of sickness absence with quite small measures. Calling sick-listed individuals to an 
information meeting is both inexpensive and an easy to implement. However an 
information meeting, where the intentions of the insurance are discussed, seems not to 
have changed individuals’ long-term behavior per se. 
The paper has the following structure. In section 2, we describe the Swedish sickness 
and unemployment insurances. In section 3, we describe IM and section 4 presents the 
experiment. Section 5 discusses identification issues. The results and sensitivity analysis 
are presented in sections 6 and 7, respectively. Section 8 discusses the relative 
importance of the two components of the combined treatment and, finally, section 9 
concludes the paper.  
2  Sickness and unemployment insurances 
The sickness and unemployment insurances (henceforth SI and UI respectively) 
sometimes overlap in a way that can generate unintended flows between them (see e.g. 
Kreuger and Meyer 2002). Several studies have shown that persons progress from the 
unemployment insurance into the sickness insurance when the replacement rate is 
higher in the latter (Henningsen, 2006; Autor and Duggan, 2006; Karlstrom, Palme and 
Svensson, 2007 and European Economic Advisory Group, 2007). In Sweden, the 
sickness insurance is more generous than the unemployment insurance. Hence, as 
expected, we have a progression from the unemployment insurance into the sickness 
insurance (Larsson, 2006, and Larsson and Runeson, 2007). In the following section, we 
present the differences between the Swedish SI and UI at the time of this study. 
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Compensation from the Swedish sickness insurance consists of two main benefits: 
disability benefit and sickness benefit. Disability benefit compensates individuals whose 
work capacity is permanently reduced. Sickness benefit replaces part of the income loss 
during temporary illness. In this study, the focus is on sick-listed individuals who 
received sickness benefit.  
The sickness benefit is income-related and covers all employed workers. Students 
and unemployed workers are also eligible as long as they have been employed before 
undertaking studies or becoming unemployed. Their benefits are based on the wage they 
received before their studies or unemployment. Furthermore, students must be seeking 
employment when their sickness absence ends and unemployed people must be 
registered at a local employment office as a job seeker.  
The replacements rates have changed over time.
6 At the time of this study, the first 
day of sickness was uncompensated. From the second day onwards the benefit was 
about 80 percent of the earnings up to a limit equal to yearly earnings of about SEK 
380,000, which corresponds to earnings in the 90
th percentile of the earning distribution. 
The employers paid the benefits for the first 14 days of the illness period. Thereafter the 
Swedish Social Insurance Agency (SSIA) paid the sickness benefit. For students and the 
unemployed, the SSIA paid sickness benefit from the second day of the absence.  
Within a week, at the very latest on the eighth day of the sickness spell, the claimant 
must verify eligibility by showing a doctor’s certificate that documents reduced working 
capacity due to illness. The public insurance office then judges the certificate and 
decides upon further sickness benefit. It is very rare that the certificate is not approved. 
The certificate contains an expectation of the length of reduced working capacity. In 
general, a sick-listed individual needs to renew the certificate regularly (about every 
fourth week) in order to prove continued reduced working capacity. 
When an individual has been granted sickness benefit, a rehabilitation plan should be 
set up. The doctor has the responsibility for the medical rehabilitation, and the potential 
employer has the responsibility for workplace rehabilitation. If the insured is 
                                                 
6 In 2003, the replacement rates in the two insurances were harmonized in order to avoid unintended flows from the 
UI to the SI. 
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SSIA coordinates the different rehabilitation plans. 
2.2  Unemployment insurance  
The UI is administrated by 36 UI funds representing workers from different 
occupational groups. All together, the UI funds cover 85 percent of the work force and 
65 percent of the adult population.  
At the time of this study, there were several reasons for reporting sick if 
unemployed.
7 First, there was at least six-months qualification period within the UI, 
while the SI provided income replacement from the second day. Thus, people who were 
approaching the end of a short-term employment (less than months) were insured by SI 
but not by UI.  
Second, for many people the replacement rate was higher within the SI. In both 
insurances 80 percent of income was replaced up to a limit, but the limit was higher in 
the SI. Thus, the SI was more generous for those with incomes over the ceiling. In 
addition, the limit was lowered after 100 days with UI payments, but not with SI 
payment. In simple terms, in comparison to UI, the maximal replacement was 65 
percent higher within SI during the first 100 days of payment, thereafter 74 percent 
higher (SOU, 2007).  
Finally, there were differences in the maximum duration of compensation: 
unemployment benefit was limited to 300 working days, whereas sickness benefit had 
no formal time limit.  
3 Information  meetings 
Information meetings have been held between 2005 and 2006 by the Local Social 
Insurance Office in Uppsala, which will be termed the ‘Office’ hereafter. To each 
meeting, 20 to 30 sick-listed individuals were called by a letter sent out about two 
weeks before the meeting. It was clearly implied in the letter that the meeting offered 
information only. The letter was short, but it was clear that the information was about 
                                                 
7 This section is based on SOU (2007), in which further details about differences between SI and UI are found.  
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employer. It was also stated that the meeting would last for about an hour and that 
participation was mandatory; the called individuals should attend the meeting or contact 
the local Office and present a valid reason for not attending. Examples of valid reasons 
for not attending were hospitalization and mental problems implying difficulties to visit 
a public meeting.  
The Office is divided into different divisions. For example, there are special 
divisions for the insured who are publicly employed, privately employed and 
unemployed. Sub-areas, outside the city of Uppsala, also have their special divisions for 
the insured living in the particular area. The experiment was conducted at the division 
for those without permanent employment and at the division for the small sub-area of 
Gimo. These two divisions are called “Division for the unemployed” and “Division 
Gimo”, respectively. 
3.1  Division for the unemployed 
An individual belongs to the division for the unemployed if they lack an employer with 
rehabilitation responsibility. The Office obtains this information from the insured’s 
application for sickness benefit. This application is renewed regularly during a longer 
period of sickness absence. If, therefore, an individual is employed at the beginning of a 
sickness period but becomes unemployed during the sickness period, they are 
transferred to the division for unemployed in the middle of a sickness absence.  
Between January 2005 and December 2006, the inflow of all sick-listed individuals 
into the division for the unemployed was called to IM. Exceptions were if the case-
worker had information indicating that it would not be appropriate to call (for example 
if the individual was in hospital). The calls and the meetings were held about once a 
month. In total, around 400 individuals per year have been called by this division.  
3.2 Division  Gimo 
Division Gimo oversees all kinds of sick-listed individuals. Eligible candidates were 
those whose sickness benefit qualifications were unclear. In practice, many of them lack 
permanent employment. The meetings were organized in the same way as for the 
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of sick-absentees. At this division, IMs were held during 2006.
 8 
4 The  experiment 
We have created an exogenous variation in the timing of calling sick-listed individuals 
to IM. When a case-worker had recorded an eligible individual in a digital register, a 
random generator decided whether the individual should be called at once or whether 
the call should be postponed until the next occurrence, about 30 days later. The random 
generator was built into the computer and the assignment was balanced, i.e. there was a 
50 percent chance of being called immediately or at a later date. This randomization 
was repeated every time an IM was planned to be held. Thus, at the next occasion, the 
case-worker called half of all the new candidates and all of the individuals whose calls 
had been postponed on the previous occasion.
9 In total, the experiment included 11 
subsequent randomizations: eight at the division for the unemployed and three at the 
local office in Gimo.  
4.1 Data 
The experimental data was collected between May and December 2006 by the Office in 
Uppsala. This data included detailed information on the experiment: the date for each 
randomization, when actually called, when the meeting was held, if the insured 
individual participated in the meeting or not.  
We have matched (via a personal identification number) the experimental data with a 
register, provided by the SSIA, about all individual sickness-absence spells during the 
study period. From this register, we have selected the first sickness spell during which a 
randomization took place. In total, the experiment includes 352 individuals. Out of the 
352, 275 were actually on sick-leave when a randomization took place. The reason for 
why about 20 percent do not match is that case-workers selected eligible candidates 
from registers about two weeks before the actual randomizations. Thus, a significant 
                                                 
8 Excluding Gimo from the analysis does not change the main conclusions.  
9 This implies that an individual (who received a call with delay) could have ended their sickness absence before 
receiving a call. 
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All statistics presented in the following are based on the 275 individuals who 
participated in the experiment and who were on sick leave during a randomization. We 
observe these 275 individuals until the 20 September 2008. At this point of time 54 
people were still claiming sickness leave. 
Finally, in order to describe the study population and to check the validity of our 
results, we have added detailed register information on social background and the sick 
spell (for example diagnosis at the commencement of the sickness absence).  
4.2 Study  population 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the individuals who have been called and, as a 
comparison, all other sick spells in Uppsala County during the study period. As the 
table shows, our study population differs in several aspects from the average insured 
individual who reported sick. Since we are studying individuals who are weakly 
established on the labor market, it is not surprising that the study population consists of 
more immigrants, lesser-educated individuals and individuals with a lower average 
income. There are fewer women than men in the study population, the average age is 
lower and fewer individuals are married. Finally, among all the sick-listed individuals, 
the two most common reasons for sickness absence are related to mental problems or 
musculoskeletal disorder (the diagnosis at the beginning of the sickness-spell). In the 
study population, the fraction with a mental diagnosis is larger, compared with the 
corresponding share among all sick-listed individuals. 
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study period 
  Experimental data All sick spells 
Variables  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev. 
Female = 1 if yes   0.53*** 0.50  0.62  0.49 
Age 44.21** 11.54  46.53  11.73 
Immigrant = 1 if yes  0.27*** 0.44  0.17  0.38 
Post upper sec. education = 1 if yes 0.20**  0.40  0.27  0.44 
Married = 1 if yes  0.37*** 0.48  0.46  0.50 
Divorced = 1 if yes  0.16  0.37  0.16  0.36 
Number of children  0.67  1.01  0.75  1.05 
Earned income (SEK 100,000/year)  1.36*** 2.41  1.68  1.35 
Mental diagnosis  0.30*** 0.46  0.20  0.40 
Musculoskeletal disorder  0.23  0.42  0.24  0.43 
Observations 275  18,001 
Notes: St. dev. is standard deviation. * stat. sign. at 10 percent level, ** stat. sign. at 5 percent level and *** stat. sign. 
at 1 percent level. Significance levels are based on standard t-test.  
4.3  A first look at data 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the persons who participated in the experiment, 
divided upon when they were called. As expected, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the groups with respect to any background variable which allows us 
to conclude that the experiment was conducted as planned.  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on how many days the individual had been on 
sick-leave, both when randomized and after randomization until the end of our follow-
up period. The difference between those called at once and those called with a delay is 
statistically insignificant at the time for randomization, but not after. At the time for 
randomization, individuals in both groups have been on sick leave for about 100 days. 
The reason for this relatively long mean duration is that the randomizations took place 
when a sick-listed individual was assigned into the division for the unemployed (or 
picked from the stock in Gimo) and not from the inflow into sickness benefit. Further, 
the variation in the number of days on sick-leave at the time for randomization is large. 
Descriptive statistics for each randomization separately show that this variation is rather 
constant across randomizations and, hence, is not explained by seasonal variation.  
After randomization there is a difference: those who were called with delay were on 
average on sick leave 65 days longer than those who were called at once. The difference 
in median between the groups is 94. This number indicates a positive effect of the 
program; the probability to leave a sick spell increases when an individual is called to 
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censored and the experiment consists of eleven different randomizations with 
potentially different distributions of individuals at each randomization. In the next 
section we discuss identification and estimation in this context. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics by treatment status and test for mean differences 
 
Called without 
delay  Called with delay  t-test of 
difference in 
means  Variables Mean St.  dev Mean St.dev 
Female = 1 if yes   0.55 0.50 0.51 0.50  -0.52
Age 45.57 11.85 44.84 11.24  -0.52
Immigrant = 1 if yes  0.28 0.45 0.25 0.44  -0.43
Post upper sec. education = 1 if yes  0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41  0.21
Married = 1 if yes  0.40 0.49 0.34 0.48  -1.04
Divorced = 1 if yes  0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35  -0.80
Number of children  0.65 1.01 0.69 1.01  0.40
Earned income (SEK 100,000/year)  1.21 1.20 1.51 3.29  1.02
Mental diagnosis  0.27 0.45 0.33 0.47  1.06
Musculoskeletal disorder  0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41  -0.64
Observations 141 134 
Note: St. dev. is standard deviation and t-test is with respect to differences in means.  
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics by treatment status 
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Notes: Standard errors are displayed within parenthesis. Q50 is the median. Equality of means is tested with standard 
t-tests. A Pearson chi-squared test is performed for the equality of the medians.  
5  Identification and estimation 
The aim is to estimate the combined effect of the call and the meeting. The outcome of 
interest is the potential effect on the sickness absence duration or the hazard to leave a 
sickness spell. Although the analysis is based on experimental data, the identification 
and non-parametric estimation is not straightforward.  
Normally, the untreated population is used to estimate the counterfactual hazard or 
the survival function (i.e., the survival function the treated population would have had 
in the absence of the call). In this study a traditional control group only exists for about 
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estimate the counterfactual survival function for longer durations than 30 days.  
Even though this program affects behavior, we do not expect to observe this on the 
sickness absence durations instantaneously. The reason is the process of sickness 
benefit entitlement. Sickness absence duration is determined by how many days the 
sick-listed individual is entitled to sickness benefit, which in turn is determined by the 
certificate verifying reduced working capacity. The certificate needs to be renewed after 
a certain number of days. In general, the medical doctor renews the certificate after a 
personal meeting with the individual. The certificate is written by the medical doctor, 
but in practice the sick-listed individual can influence the outcome. The length of 
sickness absence is, according to Arrelöv, Edlund and Goine (2006), largely controlled 
by the insured person’s motivation. Englund (2001) also finds that doctors frequently 
take decisions contrary to their own conviction (e.g. they prescribe too long sickness-
absence spells). Hence, any potential effect on sick-spell durations is expected first 
when the certificate has to be renewed.
10 That is, although behavior is affected 
instantaneously, we would expect to observe this in sick-spell durations – as ended sick-
spells – with a delay. In addition, the length of this delay is heterogeneous among the 
sick-listed individuals depending on when the certificate has to be renewed.  
The experimental design in combination with the delay in when we expect observing 
the effect hampers us to estimate the effect of the program relative to not receiving it. 
Alternatively, we estimate the effect of receiving the call immediately relative to about 
month later.   
We start by estimating hazard functions for the two groups. The individuals who 
were called immediately, we denote as “treated” (T = 1) and the individuals who 
potentially received a call with delay, are denoted “controls” (T = 0). The survival 
functions for these two groups are:  
1





== − = ∏
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10 The individual has the option to end the sickness-absence spell in advance but in practice this happens very rarely. 
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(| ) hs T j =
In order to estimate the effect of receiving the call at once relative to receiving it with 
a delay, we calculate the difference between the two groups. Under the null hypothesis 
(no effect), we have that  (| 1 ) (| 0 ) hs T hsT = ==
1 ) (| 0 ) T hsT => =
() (| tS t
 for all s. Under the alternative 
hypothesis, we expect , for all s < 30 (i.e., a monotonous 
treatment effect on the hazard), implying
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potential reduction in days absent due to sickness is calculated as the sum of the 
differences between the groups from the first day after randomization until the end of 
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This estimate provides a lower bound of an effect of receiving the call relative to not 
receiving it.  
6 Results 
Figure 1 presents the difference between the survival functions of the treated and the 
controls, evaluated up to 850 days since randomization. Initially, there is no difference 
between the groups. After about 50 days there is a non-statistically significant negative 
difference and after about 200 days it becomes statistically significant (at the 5 percent 
level).  
During the follow-up period, the sum of the differences between the groups is 74 
days. The mean sickness absence duration (of controls) is 359 days (from Table 3). 
Thus, for a typical individual in the study population, the sick-spell duration increases 
by about 20 percent on average (74/378=20) if the call is delayed by about one month.  
 
14  IFAU – Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings?  Difference
 
Figure 1 Difference in survival function between treated and controls 
Note: 95 percent confidence interval (95 % c.i.) is estimated point wise and in accordance with Greenwood 
(1926). 
7 Sensitivity  analysis 
The experiment consists of 11 sequential randomizations. Within each randomization 
the number of individuals is small. Thus, a potential concern is whether the treatment 
and the control group balance in important aspects. In order to address this, we perform 
three different sensitivity analyses.  
First, we perform a log-rank test (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959). That is, we test the 
equality of the survival functions between the treatment group and the control group by 
comparing the difference in expected and actual numbers of ended sick-spells.
11 This 
we do for each of the 11 experiments separately. Combining the differences from all the 
                                                 
11 We have applied the log-rank test of equal survivor functions provided by STATA 11. Details about this test can 
be presented upon request. 
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the 10 percent level (p-value < 0.07). The advantage of this test is that it is non-
parametric. The drawback is that it does not allow us to estimate the magnitude of the 
effect.  
Second, we apply a matching approach. Using the nearest neighbor without 
replacement matching estimator (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), each treated individual 
(within each randomization) receives one control with about the same number of days 
on previous sick-leave at the time for randomization. Since each randomization does not 
balance in the number of treated- and control individuals, this procedure excludes 25 
treated individuals for which we could not find a suitable match in the control group. 
On this matched sample, we re-estimate the difference in survival functions between 
treated and controls. The result is basically the same as in Figure 1 – the estimated 
difference is 60 days, implying an effect of 17 percent (which is a somewhat smaller 
effect). Figure A 1 in Appendix 1 presents the result on the matched sample. 
Finally, we estimate the effect of delaying the call with the semi-parametrically Cox 
regression model (Cox, 1972). Cox regression models enable us to control for the 
different randomization dates, the month of the sick-spell start and individual observed 
heterogeneity. The drawback is the assumption of a proportional effect over time on the 
baseline hazard. However, when we test the proportional hazard assumption, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis of a proportional hazard model.
12  Table 4 presents estimation 
results of four different Cox regression models. Column (1) shows the estimate without 
control variables. In column (2) we stratify on randomization date, in column (3) we 
add dummy variables for the month of sick-spell start and, finally, in column (4) we add 
individual covariates. 
The estimated effects are of the same magnitude irrespectively of model 
specifications. Hence, the result is robust and the interpretation is that the hazard rate of 
leaving the sickness absence increases by on average 29 percent when called without 
delay.
 13 
                                                 
12 The test is performed according to Grambesch and Therneau (1994) on the full model with all covariates (those 
presented in Table 1). 
13 This effect is estimated as 100*(exp (estimate)-1). 
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Table 4 The effect of an early call on the hazard from a sickness absence 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Early call  0.281  0.249  0.211  0.254 
 (0.135)**  (0.138)*  (0.143)  (0.146)* 
Stratified by randomization  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Month of sick spell start  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Covariates No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 275  275  275  275 
Notes: Cox regression models estimated with maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Under the assumption of no duration-dependence in the baseline hazard, this effect 
on the hazard is also the effect on the duration. However, the baseline hazard is not 
constant (see Figure A 2 in Appendix 1). In order to get the effects on the duration, we 
proceeded as follows. First, we non-parametrically estimate the hazard rate for the 
controls. Second, we estimate the corresponding hazard rate for the treatment group by 
simply multiplying the baseline estimate with the coefficient received from the Cox 
regression model. Third, we estimate the survival functions for the control and 
treatment groups and compare them. The average sickness-spell duration for an 
individual in the control group is 378 days. The sum of the differences during this 
period corresponds to 110 days, giving a percentage effect of about 29 percent 
(109/378).
14 This is a somewhat larger effect than the one received in section 6. 
Unfortunately, there is no (as far as we know) possibility to test whether this difference 
in estimates is statistically significant. 
8  Monitoring and/or new information 
The estimated effect consists of two potential components: increased monitoring 
through the call and new information through the meeting. These two components 
probably have different implications for future sickness absence; increased monitoring 
may affect behaviour temporarily but not significantly in the longer term, while (new) 
information may affect take-up rates more permanently.  
                                                 
14 The size of this effect turned out to be the same as the effect on the baseline hazard (the hazard of receiving the call 
early). 
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ongoing sick-spell. Focusing on the ongoing spell does not allow us to identify 
separately the effect of the meeting. The reason is that the meeting took place about one 
month after the randomization and only those who still were on sick leave at this point 
in time were eligible for the meeting (some individuals had ended their spells, either due 
to the potential “threat” or simply because of improved health).
15 This implies that those 
who attended the meeting on average had longer sick-spells than those who did not. 
Thus, simply including a time varying dummy variable – that takes the value zero 
before the meeting and one after the meeting – in a hazard regression model would give 
a biased estimate of the causal effect of the meeting on the hazard from sickness 
absence. However, we can use the exogenous variation in when the call was sent as an 
instrument for attendance and estimate the effect of the meeting on sickness absence 
prevalence. Before a more thorough discussion on this, we present, in Table 5, some 
descriptive statistics on those who attended the meeting and on those who did not.  
According to Table 5, there is no strong selection into the meeting with respect to 
observable characteristics. There is only one statistically significant difference: fewer 
individuals with a mental disorder participated in the meeting. Since mental disorder 
was a conceivable reason to not attend at the meeting, this is no surprise. More 
important is the fact that – despite the obligation to show up at the meeting – only 30 
percent (79/(193+79)) of all the individuals who were actually called attended a 
meeting. This low number suggests that a significant part of the effect stems from 
simply receiving the call, i.e., a “threat” effect.  
   
                                                 
15 25 control individuals had ended their sick spells before they received the call.  
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  Not participated  Participated 
  Mean  St. dev.  N  Mean  St. dev.  N 
Female 0.55  0.50  193  0.48  0.50  79 
Age 43.02  11.74  193  43.77  11.11  79 
Immigrant 0.26  0.44  193  0.28  0.45  79 
Post upper sec. education   0.19 0.39 193  0.25  0.44 79 
Married 0.37  0.48  193  0.38  0.49  79 
Divorced 0.17  0.38  193  0.14  0.35  79 
Number of children  0.62  0.99  193  0.73  0.97  79 
Earned income (SEK 100,000/year)  1.43  2.78  193  1.18  1.11  79 
Mental diagnosis  0.33**  0.47  193  0.22  0.41  79 
Musculoskeletal disorder  0.20  0.40  193  0.28  0.45  79 
Notes: * stat. sign. at 10 percent level, ** stat. sign. at 5 percent level and *** stat. sign. at 1 percent level. 
Significance levels are based on standard t-test. St. dev. is standard deviation.  
 
By regressing IM on an assignment dummy (and all other controls used earlier), we 
learn that there is a 32 percent increased probability to attend the meeting if the call was 
received early in comparison with later (see Table 6, column 1). Hence, the exogenous 
variation in when the call was sent can be used as an instrument for the meeting. 
However, a caveat is the potential “treat effect” since it also implies a direct effect on 
sickness prevalence. Thus, we need to assume that a potential “threat” affects the hazard 
rate at the time of the call, only and, hence, not sickness prevalence in the long term.  
The last randomization was performed in November 2006. The control individuals 
from this randomization received their delayed call in the end of December 2006 
implying that a potential “threat” affected their sickness absence behavior in the 
beginning of 2007. We can observe our study group to the end of 2007 and we estimate 
the effect of the meeting on sickness absence prevalence the first day in each month in 
2007. Thus, if the last randomization (call) induced a “threat effect”, the two stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimator is biased when applied for outcomes in the beginning of 2007.  
Important to note is that if the hazard rates (both from sickness absence and into 
sickness absence) are heterogeneous, the 2SLS estimator identifies a local average 
treatment effect (LATE)
16. This is the treatment effect for the compliers – the treatment 
effect for those who attended the meeting if they were called early but who would not if 
they were called with delay. In Appendix 2, we discuss this in more detail. 
                                                 
16 See e.g. Angrist and Krueger (1999) for a formal discussion of LATE-parameters.  
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The estimated parameters from the first step, reduced form (RF) and the 2SLS 
estimators are displayed in Table 6. We present the results without (Panel A) and with 
control variables (Panel B). The RF and 2SLS estimates are replicated for each month in 
2007. First, note that the estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of the control 
variables. Hence controlling for covariates is not essential for the inferences why the 
LATE is, basically, non-parametrically identified.
17 The RF and 2SLS parameters are 
imprecisely estimated but the point-estimates indicate an informative pattern. In order to 
illustrate this, we have in plotted the 2SLS estimates (with 95 percent confidence 
intervals) for each month in 2007. Except from the first quarter, all estimates are 
negative. An explanation for the initial positive estimates is that the control group in the 
last randomization reacted on the “threat” in the beginning of 2007 and, hence, did not 
renew their certificate in the first quarter. In April, there is a statistically significant 
negative effect. However, from May onwards the point estimates monotonously 
decreases toward zero. The interpretation is that the meeting reduced sickness absence 
by 80 percent in April but by only 10 percent in the end of the year. Our conclusion is 
that attendance at the meeting did matter, at least for the compliers. However, since the 
estimated effects declined with time, we believe that the meeting affected individual 
behavior in about the same manner as the threat, namely through increased monitoring. 
Thus, this program has strong short-run effects but no effects in a longer perspective. 
 
 
17 Due to the small sample size, we refrain from using the non-parametric estimator suggested by Frölich (2007). Table 6 Estimates from the first step (OLS) and reduced form and two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation on the effects of the 
meeting on sickness prevalence each month in 2007 
First  step Jan  Feb  Mar Apr  May  Jun Jul  Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
 
Panel A: No control variables 
 Reduced  form 
0.320  0.028  -0.029  -0.043 -0.135  -0.120  -0.084 -0.069 -0.055 -0.083 -0.054 -0.024 -0.017 
(0.064)***  (0.115)  (0.116)  (0.116) (0.063)** (0.061)* (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
  2SLS 
  0.142  -0.073  -0.126 -0.476  -0.418  -0.278 -0.222 -0.167 -0.277 -0.163 -0.050 -0.022 
  (0.435)  (0.444)  (0.448) (0.260)*  (0.250)* (0.243) (0.239) (0.236) (0.241) (0.235) (0.230) (0.229) 
 
Panel B: All control variables 
  Reduced form 
0.316  0.084  0.033  0.018  -0.124  -0.111  -0.079 -0.070 -0.054 -0.071 -0.040 -0.013 -0.002 
(0.067)***  (0.118)  (0.119)  (0.119) (0.065)*  (0.063)* (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
  2SLS  
  0.378  0.183  0.127  -0.443  -0.394  -0.268 -0.232 -0.169 -0.237 -0.115 -0.008 0.036 
  (0.445)  (0.446)  (0.448) (0.266)*  (0.255)  (0.247) (0.244) (0.241) (0.244) (0.235) (0.235) (0.234) 
 
Share on sick-leave 
Overall  0.73  0.65 0.63  0.52  0.50  0.49 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.45 
Called  early  0.74  0.64 0.60  0.45  0.44  0.45 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
Called  late  0.71  0.67 0.65  0.59  0.56  0.54 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.46 
  Notes: standard error within parentheses, ** statistical significant at the 5 percent level, ** statistical significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Figure 2 IV estimates of the effect of attending the meeting on the probability of being 
on sick-leaving each month in 2007 
9 Concluding  discussion 
Calling sick-listed individuals without permanent employment (who are weakly 
established on the labor market) to information meetings about the rights and duties 
associated with the insurance significantly reduces the length of their sickness absence. 
Our result, based on a social experiment, suggests that a call would lead to a reduction 
of the length by, at least, 20 percent on average.  
The information program may have affected behavior in two ways: through increased 
monitoring induced by the call and through the information obtained at the meeting. 
The low attendance rate at the meetings (30 percent) suggests that a significant part of 
the effect stems from a “threat”. However, in order to learn more of the behavioral 
mechanisms we also estimate the importance of the information meeting on sickness 
prevalence each month in 2007. The result from the estimations suggests that the 
22  IFAU – Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings?  meeting also played a role, at least for the compliers (those who attended the meeting 
when called early but who would not have attended the meeting if called with delay). 
The estimated effect of the meeting monotonously decreased over time, suggesting 
strong short-run effects but no effects in a longer perspective. Our conclusion is that 
lack of knowledge about the rights and duties associated with the insurance is not a 
likely reason for why this group of individuals was on sickness benefit.  
The large combined effect on the hazard should be interpreted with the target group 
for this study in mind. Individuals in this group were in most cases unemployed, 
temporarily employed or involuntarily part-time employed. During the last years there 
have been institutional changes aimed to harmonize the sickness and the unemployment 
insurance. However, there are still economic incentives for being sick-listed rather than 
unemployed. The large estimated suggests that moral hazard is a problem among 
unemployed sick-listed individuals also in the present institutional setting.  
For guiding policies aiming to reduce moral hazard we need better knowledge about 
the behavioral mechanisms associated with the usage of the sickness insurance. This 
study shows that it is possible to shorten the length of sickness absence with quite small 
measures. Calling sick-listed individuals to an information meeting is both inexpensive 
and an easy to implement. However information meeting where the intentions with the 
insurance are discussed does not seem to change individuals’ long-term behavior. 
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Figure A 2 Histogram of sick-spells durations since randomization by treatment group 
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meeting 
Let Yc(1) be the potential prevalence of sickness in calendar time c if in IM (that is IM is 
set to 1) and let Yc(0) be the potential prevalence of sickness in calendar time c if not in 
IM (that is IM is set to 0). For a given individual only one of these potential outcomes 
are observed. The observed prevalence for individuals in a population eligible of IM can 
hence be written as: 
 
(0) ( (1) (0)) cc c c YY I M Y Y =+ − .     A1 
 
The potential prevalence of sickness absence in calendar time c depends on the potential 
duration in the sickness and the non-sickness state, respectively. For convenience, 
assume no duration dependence from the sickness state into the non-sickness state or 
vice versa. Then the probability distribution of sickness prevalence is: 
 
Pr( ( ) 1) ( ) (1/ ( ) ) , 0,1
not sick
c Yj j j j λλ π == × = = j      A.2 
 
Here   and  is the incidence into sickness (i.e. hazard from the non-





sick λ  
and  (0)
sick λ  are the corresponding hazards from sickness (into non-sickness).  
Let the prevalence in state j be additively separable in the population mean,  j π , 
individual i’s difference, from this mean,  ij π , and an idiosyncratic error term  ij η . That 
is:  
 
( ) ,    1,..., . ic j ij ij Yj i n π πη =++ =      A . 2  
 
We assume that the individual differences in expectation is zero, that is 
( ) 0, 0,1 ij Ej π == . The average treatment effect is, hence, equal to:  
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11 0 0 10 (( ) ) ii E π ππ π π π +−+ = −= Δ π , 
 
By using equation A.1, the regression of prevalence in calendar time c on IM can be 
written as: 
 
0 ic i i YI M π πξ =+ Δ +       A . 3  
 
where  10 10 0 (( ) ( )) ii i ii i i IM 0 i ξ ππ ηη πη =− + − + + .  
 
The problem of estimating  π Δ  with ordinary least squares is that  i ξ  contains the 
individual difference from the population mean,  0 i π , which also determines the 
probability to attend IM. In order to illustrate this, we can, without loss of generality, let 
the hazard rate from sickness at duration τ  at the time of the experiment, () i λ τ
(
, be equal 
to the hazard rate if not attending IM after the experiment, that is  () 0 )
sick
i λτ i = λ . The 
duration in sickness absence at the time of the experiement   for individual i can then 
be expressed as:  
i T
 
0 exp( (0) ) , 1,...,
wa
ii i Td i λτ ε
∞
=− = ∫ n ,     (A.4) 
 
where  i ε  is an idiosyncratic error. Let   be the time of IM for indivdual i in assyncrone 
time (i.e. measured at the duration), then the treatment assigment is defined as:  
i t
 
( ), 1,..., ii i IMI T t i n =>= ,      (A.5) 
 
where   is the indicator function which takes value one when the expression is true. 




i λ , the assignment given in equation (A.5) depends on 
0 i π  (see A.2 and A.3). Hence:  
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(0) ci i YI ⊥ M  
 
It is reasonable to assume that individuals with high incidence also have low hazard 
rates, that is Cov( , ()
not
i j λ ()
sick
i j λ ) < 0. An implication of this assumption is that those 
who attended IM also have high prevalence, that is  0 i π  is high for those who attended 
IM. In this situation, an OLS estimator of the average treatment effect of the treated 
would be downward biased. 
Instrumental variables estimator and local average treatment effect 
Let   and   be the assignment into IM if called early (Z = 1) and late (Z = 0). 
Then the observed assignments is:  
(1) IM (0) IM
 
(0) ( (1) (0)) IM IM Z IM IM =+ − . 
 
Since  Z is randomized it is clear that those with Z  = 1 and Z = 0 have the same 
distributions, that is:  
 
() (1), (0) IMI M Z ⊥  
 
In order to estimate the treatment effects of the treated using an instrumental variables 
estimator,
18 the potential prevalence distributions also needs to be independent of Z, that 
is:  
 
() (1), (0) cc YY Z ⊥  
 
                                                 
18 Note that under homogenous treatment effects, a mean independence assumption is sufficient. 
IFAU – Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings?  31   This will hold if any potential threat effect from the call only has a short term effect on 
the hazard in the duration in which the call was sent. Note that we can write equation 
A.3 as:  
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n 00 ,1 , . . , ic i i i YI M i π πυ =+ Δ + =      A . 3  
 
where   1 000 0 ii i i π 0 i πππ π ππ π Δ=−+ − = Δ + − 0 i  and  10 0 () ii i i i IM υ ηη πη = −+ + . In our 
setting, the individuals who remain in the sickness state until they receive IM will, in 
general, have higher  0 i π (i.e. lower  ) than the population in general implying 
that the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator does not estimate the average 
treatment effect. However the conventional 2SLS estimator will estimate the treatment 
effect for the compliers (i.e. for those who attend IM if called early but not if called late) 
if there are no defiers (a defier is an individual who attend IM if called late but not if 




Finally, note that the assumption of no defiers is weak in our setting. Since the IM is 
obligatory, the only reason for not attending is to leave the sickness state. If there is a 
threat effect and under the assumption that this threat effect is the same irrespectively of 
when the call is received, these individual are, in this set up, denoted never takers. 
Hence, the compliers are determined by the idiosyncratic error  i ε  in A.4; those with a 
large  i ε  flow out before the meeting if called late but attend the meeting if called early. 
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